In two early papers, Max Cresswell constructed two formal logics of propositional identity,  and , which he observed to be respectively deductively equivalent to modal logics 4 and 5. Cresswell argued informally that these equivalences respectively "give . . . evidence" for the correctness of 4 and 5 as logics of broadly logical necessity. In this paper, I describe weaker propositional identity logics than  that accommodate core intuitions about identity and I argue that Cresswell's informal arguments do not firmly and without epistemic circularity justify accepting 4 or 5. I also describe how to formulate standard modal logics (, 2, and their extensions) with strict equivalence as the only modal primitive.
T   
Cresswell [2, 3] constructs two formal logics of propositional identity,  and , and informally argues for the correctness of 4 and 5 as logics of broadly logical necessity on the grounds of their respective deductive equivalence to  and . I will describe weaker propositional identity logics than  that accommodate core intuitions about identity, and I will argue that Cresswell's informal arguments do not firmly and without epistemic circularity justify accepting 4 or 5. I myself will not argue for or against the correctness of 4 or 5.
 is  + {, , 1, 2, 3}. 1  is the classical non-modal propositional calculus formulated with uniform substitution () and modus ponens () as basic inference rules.
is an arbitrary -tautology. '=' is a binary modal operator and is the only modal primitive in . 'α = β' is read as 'that α is the very same proposition as that β'. 2 () (p = q) ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having p in some of the places where β has q.
() If (α ≡ β) then (α = β).
(1) 2α = df (α = )
 has theorems (, ) formally expressing the contentious metaphysical view that () strict equivalence is propositional identity and logical necessity is identity with a tautology. 3 () (p = q) = (p ↔ q)
's sole axiom, , is a principle of substitutivity (or indiscernibility) of identical propositions and  has theorems (1-3) affirming the reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of propositional identity. 4 (1) p = p (2) (p = q) ⊃ (q = p) 1 I use "" and other names of logical systems with deliberate ambiguity. In one sense, for example, "" names a logic, that is, a set of theses (axioms and theorems). In another sense, "" names a particular basis or axiomatization of that logic, that is, a particular set of axioms, basic inference rules, and definitions, whose closure is  (first sense). Context will generally resolve this ambiguity but I will sometimes specify a sense explicitly. 2 For my own convenience, I have altered Cresswell's notation and some propositions' names, and added some definitions. I generally use '=' as an operator (at Prior's suggestion; see [16, p. 190] , for example) rather than as a relational predicate. I do sometimes use '=' as a relational predicate in the meta-language or in first-order object-language expressions, but such non-operator uses of '=' are clear from context. 3 "'What are the conditions for propositional identity?' . . . is a language-independent metaphysical question whose answer demands an analysis . . . of the notion of a proposition" [5, p. 45] . That strict equivalence is propositional identity and necessity is identity with a tautology is implied by the views that (a) propositions are sets of worlds while (b) necessity is truth in all possible worlds [5, pp. 24, 39] . 4 Proofs of formal results reported in this paper are not difficult and are left as exercises for the reader.
Cresswell proves that  is deductively equivalent to 4 when the latter is extended to formally express (). 4 is  + {k, t, 4, , 2, 3}. 4 is the controversial characteristic thesis of 4. '2' is the only modal primitive in this formulation of 4.
Cresswell proves that  is deductively equivalent to 4 + 4 [2, p. 192] .
4 + 4 has as theorems , , , and 1-3. () is also well-expressed by another extension of 4, that is, by 4 +  .
Since substitution of proved material equivalents () is available even in , where  is 4 − {t, 4}, Cresswell's proof with trivial modifications establishes that  is deductively equivalent to 4 +  .
Appealing to the formal results he describes, Cresswell argues informally for 4 as a logic of broadly logical necessity.
The interesting point about  however is that  is simply the identity schema and  also seems to contain no reference to modality. The equivalence of  and 4 would seem to give further evidence for the view . . . that where ['2'] means, 'It is informally provable that' then 4 is the system which captures its meaning [2, p. 195] .
In other words, Cresswell does not rest justification for 4 merely on variable intuitions about controversial principles explicitly about necessity [6, p. 29] ; [7, pp. 51-52] . Instead, he adopts metaphysical view () and then aims to rest justification for 4 on what I will call core intuitions about identity, that is, on intuitions about identity that are both uniformly firmer and more widespread than intuitions explicitly about controversial elements of 4 or 5. Philosophers disagree about 4, for example, but no one doubts that identity is somehow reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive or that identicals are somehow substitutable.
Cresswell comes later to think that there is a further firm intuition about identity that  does not accommodate. So he extends  to  accordingly.  is +. ⊥ is an arbitrary -contradiction.
Cresswell observes that  is deductively equivalent to 5 when the latter is extended to formally express (). 5 is  + e, where  is 4 − 4.
(e) 3p ⊃ 23p  is deductively equivalent to 5 + 4 and to 5 +  . Since  is justified as a logic of propositional identity and  is deductively equivalent to 5, Cresswell informally argues, 5 is justified as a logic of broadly logical necessity [3, p. 291] .
 apparently is motivated by an intuition that all non-identities are necessary. The principle that non-identical propositions are necessarily non-identical perhaps is formalized more clearly by 4 than by .
4 is deductively equivalent to e and to  in both  + 4 and  +  , and so in both 4 + 4 and 4 +  . 5 
J  
Intuitions about identity do bear on the acceptability of 4 and 5. However, some intuitions have less epistemic potency than others and some more readily than others interact epistemically with broader philosophical considerations.
For one thing, relatively controversial principles about identity are not supported by core intuitions about identity but only by what I will call peripheral intuitions about identity, that is, by intuitions that are either not uniformly firmer or not more widespread than intuitions explicitly about controversial elements of 4 or 5. For example, the principles that all identities and nonidentities are necessary are, like 4 and e, controversial principles explicitly about necessity. So Cresswell's informal argument for 5, which rests on the intuitions behind , does not firmly and non-circularly justify acceptance of 5.
The inability of peripheral intuitions about identity to firmly justify controversial principles about necessity is aggravated by the potential such intuitions have to be defeated by the epistemic force of an otherwise well-justified metaphysical view. 6 For example, not all identities and non-identities of in-dividuals are necessary if counterpart theory is true. 7 So, if counterpart theory were otherwise well-justified, the peripheral intuitive support for the principles that identities and non-identities are necessary might be defeated. The general point applies also to propositional identity. For example, if any metaphysical view were otherwise well-justified that implies both (a) theses of contingent identity and diversity of individuals and (b) a thesis of wide content (say, counterpart theory plus Russellian propositions), then the principles of the necessity of propositional identity and diversity might be undermined. For argument's sake, represent the proposition that p, that you and I are identical, as you, me, x is identical with y and represent the proposition that q, that I am self-identical as me, me, x is identical with y . That p is not the very same proposition as that q, since they are wholes whose parts are not all shared. However, in a world in which you and I have the same counterpart, the propositions that p and that q also have the same counterpart. Say that our counterpart in one such world is Bloggs. Represent the proposition that r, which is the counterpart there of the propositions that p and that q, as Bloggs, Bloggs, x is identical with y . That r is the very same proposition as that r, so it is possible that that p is the very same proposition as that q. So, apparently, diverse propositions are not necessarily diverse if such a metaphysical view is true. Nor, by analogous reasoning, are identical propositions necessarily identical.
Like peripheral intuitions, core intuitions about identity also interact epistemically with broader philosophical considerations. Core intuitions do firmly support the uncontroversial but vague principles that identity is somehow reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive and that identicals are somehow substitutable. However, each of these vague informal principles can be given alternative but nonequivalent formal expressions, none inheriting more apparent presumptive justification than the others from the intuitions behind their vague parent. No choice of one formal expression rather than another of a vague informal principle can be justified merely by the intuitions backing the informal principle-broader philosophical considerations must be brought to bear. 8 For example, in the formal vocabulary of standard modal predicate logic (where '=' is a relational predicate, not a modal operator), 2 and 2 each express the vague principle that identicals are somehow substitutable.
(2) x = y ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having free x in some of the places where β has free y.
(2 ) x = y ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having free x in some of the places, not in the scope of any modal operator, where β has free y.
However, 2 does while 2 does not imply that all identities are necessary [6, p. 195] ; [7, p. 334] . So acceptance of 2 rather than 2 may accommodate both the intuitive precariousness of the principle that all identities are necessary and the intuitive fundamentality of the principle that identicals are somehow substitutable. Again, the general point applies also to propositional identity. For example, , 5, and 6 each express the vague principle that identical propositions are somehow substitutable.
(5) If (γ = δ) then (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having γ in some of the places where β has δ.
(6) (p = q) ⊃ (α ⊃ β), provided that α differs from β only in having p in some of the places, not in the scope of any modal operator, where β has q.
However, while  implies that (7) all propositional identities are necessary, neither 5 nor 6 implies 7.
So acceptance of either 5 or 6 rather than  may accommodate both the intuitive precariousness of the principle that all propositional identities are necessary and the intuitive fundamentality of the principle that identical propositions are somehow substitutable. So, if there are weaker propositional identity logics than  that accommodate core intuitions about identity, then a choice of one of those logics over the others cannot be justified merely by those core intuitions and Cresswell's informal argument for 4 does not firmly and non-circularly justify acceptance of 4.
N   
There are propositional identity logics that are weaker than  and in which propositional identity is somehow reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, and identical propositions are somehow substitutable.
 is such a spartan basis for 4 that it is hard to see how to weaken necessity in the system. Things are easier if one begins with a more usual basis for 4, extended to express (). I will begin with 4 +  , which has as theorems that necessity is both identical with and materially equivalent to identity with a tautology (,  ).
The basis of 4 +  is easily modified so propositional identity is the only modal primitive. Let 4 = be  + {k = , t = , 4 = ,  = ,  , 1, 2, 3}.
The bases of 4 +  and 4 = share , 2, and 3. 4 +  also has the other elements of the basis of 4 = , since k = , t = , 4 = ,  = , and  are all provable by  . And 4 = has the other elements of the basis of 4 +  , since k, t, 4, , and  are all provable by 1. So 4 = is deductively equivalent to 4 +  and so to . 4 = is a less spartan basis than  for 4 and necessity in that less spartan basis is easily weakened. Let  = be 4 = − 4.  = is deductively equivalent to  +  and to  + 4. Both  = and 4 = are logics in which propositional identity is the only modal primitive. But necessity in  = (-necessity) is weaker than necessity in 4 = (4-necessity). A spectrum of propositional identity logics is constructible in an obvious way. Each system in the spectrum has propositional identity as its only modal primitive, but necessity varies in strength from system to system, from -necessity to 5-necessity. So, for example, let  = be  = − t = ,  = be  = + b = , and 5 = be  = + e = . 9 9 Each of , , , 4, and 5 (and their extensions) can be given bases with strict equivalence as the only modal primitive (sep-bases), as follows. From the basis for the corresponding propositional identity logic, delete both  and 2, replace 1 with 5, and uniformly replace '=' throughout the basis with '↔'.
Any modal logic that has both  and  and that has a basis with necessity as the only modal primitive (an np-basis) can also be given an sep-basis by deleting any pre-existing definition of '↔' from the np-basis; then, for all α, uniformly replacing 2α throughout the basis with α ↔ ; then adding 5.
Call a propositional identity logic normal if it can be formulated on a basis that contains the basis just given for  = . 10 Every normal propositional identity logic has k = , is closed under , , and  = , and has all the following: ,  , ,  ,  , 1, 2, 3, 5, . In other words, every normal propositional identity logic formally expresses metaphysical view (): strict equivalence is propositional identity (,  ,  , ), and necessity is identity with a tautology (,  ). And every normal modal propositional identity logic accommodates core intuitions about identity: propositional identity is somehow reflexive (1), symmetric (2), and transitive (3), and identical propositions are somehow substitutable (5). Differences between stronger and weaker normal propositional identity logics correspond to the presence or absence of specific theorems or rules about propositional identity that are not imposed by core intuitions about identity.  = and  = differ in having or lacking 6, which is deductively equivalent to t in  = . 6 says that identical propositions, whether or not their identity is provable, are substitutable indiscernibly in non-modal (extensional) contexts. This contrasts with 5, according to which provably identical propositions are substitutable indiscernibly in all contexts in theorems. That is, 5 and 6 do not permit all the same substitutions.  = has both 5 and 6, while  = The preceding method can be used to give sep-bases for  and its extensions. Huntington [8] provides an sep-basis for 2. Though Hughes and Cresswell [6, p. 296] attribute 5 to him, Huntington [8, p. 5] actually uses 6, where '*' is a unary modal operator and '*α' is read 'it is impossible that α'.
1 is given by Bronstein and Tarter [1, p. 307] , who are mentioned by Hughes and Cresswell [6, p. 297, note 334] . 1 easily suggests 5. In his formulation of 2, Huntington also uses 7.
Huntington's sep-basis for 2 can be modified in obvious ways to provide sep-bases for each of 2's extensions (3, , etc.). For example, adding 3 as an axiom yields 3.
10 Call a propositional identity logic intensional if it has  . All normal propositional identity logics are intensional. If metaphysical view () is doubted, then-since  is motivated by ()--non-intensional propositional identity logics likely will be of interest and the formal distinction between '=' and '↔' will be significant. If () is not doubted, then  may seem trivial, the formal distinction between '=' and '↔' may seem otiose, and any standard modal logic, normal or not, can be made to serve as a propositional identity logic simply be reading 'α ↔ β' in that logic as 'that α is the very same proposition as that β', i.e., by adding 4. If a non-normal logic so serves, it is as a non-normal propositional identity logic. has only 5. So substitutivity (or indiscernibility) of identical propositions is stronger in  = than in  = .
The difference between 4 = and  = has two aspects. On one hand, it is the difference between the presence or absence of , which is deductively equivalent to 4 in  = .  says that identical propositions, whether or not their identity is provable, are substitutable in all contexts. That is,  permits substitutions that neither 5 nor 6 permits. 4 = has , 5, and 6, so substitutivity (or indiscernibility) of identical propositions is stronger in 4 = than in  = . But the difference between  = and 4 = is also the difference between the presence or absence of 7, a strong principle of the necessity of propositional identity that is deductively equivalent to 4 and so to  in  = .
 = and  = differ in having or lacking 8, which is deductively equivalent
8 is a weak principle of the necessity of propositional diversity, according to which propositions differing in truth-value are necessarily diverse.
A stronger principle of the necessity of propositional diversity is 4, which is deductively equivalent to e in  = . So 5 = and  = differ in having or lacking 4.
C
Cresswell's informal arguments show how modal logics 4 and 5 cohere with metaphysical view (). However, those arguments do not firmly and without epistemic circularity justify accepting 4 or 5, even conditional on the acceptability of (). Since a number of principles of propositional identity that are crucial for the justification by Cresswell's strategy even of the weaker 4 are also principles explicitly about necessity, it is difficult to see how a justifying argument for 4 or 5 might be constructed in which considerations about propositional identity have clear epistemic priority over considerations about broadly logical necessity. Since every normal propositional identity logic both formally expresses () and accommodates core intuitions about identity, it is difficult to see how intuitions about propositional identity alone, unaided by broader philosophical considerations, might justify acceptance of a propositional identity logic stronger than  = ; but there is anyway relatively little doubt that strong and widespread intuitions about broadly logical necessity alone tend to justify acceptance of a modal logic at least as strong as . 11 The Australasian Journal of Logic ( 1448-5052) disseminates articles that significantly advance the study of logic, in its mathematical, philosophical or computational guises. The scope of the journal includes all areas of logic, both pure and applied to topics in philosophy, mathematics, computation, linguistics and the other sciences.
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